Suggested Revision of Wisconsin Statutes Pertaining to the Shop Book Rule and Regular Entry Doctrine by Laikin, George J.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 18
Issue 3 April 1934 Article 2
Suggested Revision of Wisconsin Statutes
Pertaining to the Shop Book Rule and Regular
Entry Doctrine
George J. Laikin
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
George J. Laikin, Suggested Revision of Wisconsin Statutes Pertaining to the Shop Book Rule and Regular Entry Doctrine, 18 Marq. L. Rev.
173 (1934).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol18/iss3/2
SUGGESTED REVISION OF WISCONSIN
STATUTES PERTAINING TO THE
SHOP BOOK RULE AND-REGU-
LAR ENTRY DOCTRINE
GEORGE J. LAIxIN
W ISCONSIN lawyers experience considerable difficulty in intro-
ducing business entries into evidence.' Their admission is gov-
erned by section 327.24 and 327.25 of our Statutes.2
These sections originate in the common law shop book doctrine and
regular entry exception to the hearsay rule.3 The hearsay rule "pro-
hibits the use of a person's assertion, as equivalent to testimony to the
I See opinion of Justice Marshall in F. Dohmen Co. Ltd. v. Niagara Fire Ins.
Co., 96 Wis. 38, 71 N.W. 69 (1897); Wigmore and others, "Law of Evidence,
Some Proposals For Its Reform;" Aron's "Notes on Proof, the Probative
Law," (N.Y. 1932) page 46; Wigmore, "Evidence," Second Edition, Sec. 1521.
2327.24 "Account Books. (1) Proved by Party. The account books of a party
to an action or proceeding shall be received as prima facie proof of the charges
therein contained, if he shall testify and it shall satisfactorily appear from his
testimony, that the same are his account books; that they contain the original
entries of charges for goods or other articles delivered, or services performed
or materials furnished; that such entries are just to the best of his knowledge
and belief; that said entries are in his own handwriting; and that they were
made at or about the time said goods or other articles were delivered, said
services were performed or said materials were furnished. The party offering
such books shall be subject to cross-examination.
(2) Proof by Bookkeeper. When the original entries are in the hand-
writing of an agent, servant, or clerk of the party, the testimony of such agent,
servant or clerk may, with like effect and in like manner, be admitted to verify
the same.
(3) Cash Items; Rent Charge. Such books shall not be admitted as proof
of any item of money delivered at one time exceeding five dollars, or of money
paid to third persons, or of charges for rent.
(4) Ledger. Where a book shows that the items have been transferred
to a ledger, the book shall not be evidence unless the ledger be produced.
(5) Bookkeeper Deceased. Book entries made by an authorized person,
he being dead, may be received in evidence, in a case proper for the admis-
sion of the books as evidence."
327.25 "Other Book Entries. Entries on cards, sales slips, loose leaf sheets
or in a book or other permanent form (other than those mentioned in sec-
tions 327.24 and 328.24), in the usual course of business, contemporaneous
with the transactions to which they relate and as part of or connected with
such transactions, made by persons authorized to make the same, may be re-
ceived in evidence when showi to have been so made upon the testimony
either of the person who made the same, or if he be beyond the jurisdiction
of the court or insane, of any person having custody of the entries, and testi-
fying that the same were made by a person authorized to make them in whose
handwriting they are, and that they are true and correct to the best of his
knowledge and belief. In case such entries are, in the usual course of business,
also made in other books and papers as a part of the system of keeping a
record of such transactions, it shall not be necessary to produce all of the
persons who were engaged in the making of such entries; but before such en-
tries are admitted, the court shall be satisfied that they are genuine and in oth-
er respects within the provisions of this section."
3 Wigmore, Sec. 1517; see Radtke v. Taylor, 105 Or. 559, 210 Pac. 863, 27 A.L.R.
1423 (1922) for excellent discussion of history of this problem an annotated
discussion.
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fact asserted unless the asserter is brought to testify in Court on the
stand, where he may be probed and cross-examined as to the grounds
of his assertion and of his qualifications to make it."4 The business en-
tries exception to the hearsay rule was predicated upon the necessity of
admitting regular entries 5 and account books,6 because other evidence
was unavailable.7 Strictly speaking, the shop book rule is not an excep-
tion to the hearsay rule. The shop book rule was based on the incom-
petency of a party to an action as a witness in his own behalf so that
unless a party's account book was admitted in evidence he could not
prove his case." Only the regular entry doctrine developed as an excep-
tion to the hearsay rule. Since under the shop book rule, a party's books
could not be introduced in evidence if he employed a clerk, because the
clerk could be called to testify as to the transaction, if the clerk were
dead, no means existed to introduce his entries in evidence. This neces-
sitated an exception to the hearsay rule permitting the entries of a de-
ceased clerk shown to have been made in the regular course of busi-
ness to be admitted. Both the shop book and the regular entry doctrines,
however, are loosely treated as belonging to the same exception to the
hearsay rule.
Modem legislation has tended to obliterate the original purpose of
the shop book rule to the extent that some jurisdictions now allow the
admission of books kept by a deceased clerk under this rule.9 This, our
Wisconsin Statute, (section 327.24 [2] Stats. [1933]) provides that,
when the original entries are in the handwriting of an agent, servant,
or clerk of the party, the testimony of such agent, servant or clerk,
may with like effect and in like manner be admitted to verify the
same." And section 327.24 (5) provides that "book entries made by an
4 Wigmore, Sec. 1521.
5Wigmore, Sec. 1521.6Wigmore, Sec. 1527; Jones, "Evidence," (Civil cases, 3rd edition) Sec. 575.
"To qualify an entry under this exception, there must be a necessity for its
admission into evidence * * * " Lebrun v. Railroad, 83 N.H. 293 (1928).
7See discussion, post.; Wigmore, Sec. 1517. The admission of regular entries
in evidence has also been upheld on the ground that they were a part of the
res gestae. Jones, Sec. 568; Chamberlayne, "Modern Law of Evidence," Sec.
2870; Lassone v. Railroad. 66 N.H. 345, 358 (1890) ; Robinson v. Smith, 111
Mo. 205, 20 S.W. 29, 33 Am. S. Rep. 510 (1905) " * * * to constitute part
of the res gestae, they (entries) must have been made contemporaneously
with the principal fact, and must have formed a link in the chain of events,
and belonged ordinarily and naturally to the present thing." 53 L.R.A. 521, 543.
It is submitted that the foregoing prerequisites qualify an entry as a regular
entry, and admissible as such without reference to the res gestae doctrine.
8 The common law shop book rule required that a party be his own bookkeeper
and that he have no clerk.
The English rules are more restrictive. "The requirement that the declarant
should not only be acting in the course of his duty or business in doing the
very act stated, but it should also be the duty imposed upon him by some
superior authority to make an entry of it at the time when it was made, does
not obtain in the United States." Chamberlayne, Sec. 2876.
1 Wigmore, Sec. 1538.
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authorized person, he being dead, may be received in evidence in a
case proper for the admission of the books in evidence."
Section 327.25 of our Statutes 0 relating to regular entries, and
which originates in the common law exception to the hearsay rule,"
permits the qualification of entries by the "testimony * * * of the per-
son who made the same ;" whereas under the common law, the entrant
must have been dead or otherwise unavailable. Under section 327.25,
the entrant must be produced unless he is insane or beyond the jurisdic-
tion of the court. 2 This raises the problem of when for the purpose of
this section is "a party beyond the jurisdiction of the court." Today,
as under the common law, the reason for admitting regular entries is
"the impossibility of obtaining the testimony, and the cause of such
impossibility seems immaterial."'31 "The practical impossibility on
grounds of mercantile inconvenience of producing all the clerks, sales-
men, teamsters, or the like, who have contributed their knowledge in
making up the items of voluminous accounts, is by some courts consid-
ered as a sufficient ground for non-production.' 4 It is submitted that a
10 See Note 2 supra. The precise scope of the statutes in our jurisdiction is
somewhat obscure. In Kelly v. Crawford, 112 Wis. 368, 88 N.W. 296 (1901) an
early case to construe this statute, our court required a reasonably strict com-
pliance with the terms of the statute, and inasmuch as there was no proof that
any of the entries on the sheets of paper or the stub books were made in the
usual course of business or were contemporaneous with the transaction to
which they related, or were a part of such transaction, or that they were true
and correct to the best of the knowledge and belief of the custodian of these
entries, they were not admissible. See Markgraf v. Cohtmbia Bank of Lodi, 203
Wis. 429, 233 N.W. 728 (1931); Milwaukee Trust Co. v. Warren, 112 Wis.
505, 87 N.W. 801 (1902) ; Bazelon v. Lyon, 128 Wis. 337, 107 N.W. 337 (1906).
Entries are not admissible under both sections 327.24 and 327.25 and incompe-
tency under 327.24 does not necessarily admit it under 327.25.
Thus, an entry, in an account book, in excess of $5.00 incompetent under
327.24 was inadmissible as a regular entry under 327.25. "The appellant, how-
ever, contends, that the five dollar limitation above mentioned does not apply
to books admissible under section 4189 Stats. (1898) (327.25) and that under
the latter section the books in question were competent evidence. But the books
could not come within both sections. Section 4189 renders competent only en-
tries in a book or other permanent form other than those mentioned in section
4189 (327.24) * * * A book of the kind mentioned in 4189, produced as there
provided, is not made competent by section 4189. The latter section refers to
a different class of entries made in a book, or other permanent form, not
strictly a book of account, and made by some person other than the party to
the cause, his agent, servant, or clerk in his behalf. The books in question be-
ing identified as belonging to the class mentioned in section 4186, and having
been produced by a party to a cause in his own behalf, were not made compe-
tent by section 4189. On the other hand, they were expressly excluded by the
terms of section 4189. Dohinen v. Estate of Blum, 137 Wis. 560, 119 N.W.
349 (1908) ; Estate of Wallschlager, 187 Wis. 640, 205 N.W. 402 (1925).
11 Wigmore, Sec. 1521.
1In Beilke v. Knaack, 207 Wis. 490, 242 N.W. 176 (1932), the court would have
rejected the records involved if they had been prejudicial because "the sisters
who nursed the plaintiff, and who in a large part, kept daily records were not
produced on the trial, nor was it shown that they were beyond the jurisdic-
tion or insane as provided by section 327.25 Stats."
'1 Chief Justice Shaw quoted by Wigmore, Sec. 1521.
14 Wigmore, Sec. 1521.
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party should be considered "beyond the jurisdiction of the court" when
he is unavailable.
Now the complexity of modern accounting systems is in a measure
recognized by section 327.25 when it provides1 5 that where entries are
part of a regular system of bookkeeping, it shall not be necessary to
produce all of the persons engaged in keeping such bookkeeping sys-
tem, but allows admission if the court is satisfied that such entries are
genuine and within the statute.16 Where an entry was made as a part
of the regular bookkeeping system of a business, the production of the
entrant or an explanation of his absence ought to be unnecessary. Such
treatment is pursuasively suggested by Wigmore: "Why should this
conclusion not be adopted by the courts? Such entries are dealt with in
that way in the most important undertakings of mercantile and indus-
trial life. They are the ultimate basis of calculation and general confi-
dence in every business enterprise. Nor does the practical impossibility
of obtaining constantly and permanently the verification of every em-
ployee affect the trust that is given such books. It would seem that ex-
pedients which the entire commercial world recognizes as safe should
be sustained and not discredited by the courts of justice. When it is
a mere question of whether provisional confidence can be placed in a
certain class of statements, there cannot be profitably and sensibly one
rule for the business world and another for the court room. The mer-
chant and manufacturer must not be turned away remediless because
methods in which the entire commercial world places a just confidence
are a little difficult to reconcile with the technical judicial scruples on
the part of the same persons who as attorneys have already employed
and relied upon the same methods. In short, courts must cease to be
pedantic and endeavor to be practical."
If we re-examine sections 327.24 and 327.25 in the light of the
above discussion, we find that the reason for the account book rule no
longer exists because the original disqualification of the party as a
witness has quite generally been removed by statute.17 True, the party
verified the books under oath, but this did not make him a witness,
15 See Note 2, supra.
16 This is in harmony with the treatment suggested by Wigmore, namely, "That
where an entry is made by one person in the regular course of business, re-
cording an oral or written report, made to him by one or more persons in the
regular course of business, of a transaction lying in the personal knowledge of
the latter, there is no objection to receiving that entry under the present
exception, verified by the testimony of the former person only, provided the
practical inconvenience of producing on the stand the numerous persons thus
concerned would in the particular case outweigh the probable utility of doing
so." Wigmore, Sec. 1530.
27 "No person shall be disqualified as a witness * * * by reason of his interest
* ** '" 325.13 Stats. (1931).
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though subjection to cross-examination tended in that direction.' Since
a party is now free to take the stand and "relate as a witness, all his
knowledge on the subject of the transaction * * * there is no excuse
for offering his extra-judicial entries, not tested by cross-examination,
while his infra-judicial testimony given under oath and subject to cross-
examination is available. Section 327.24 further destroyed the common
law shop book rule, in permitting the party to have a clerk, allowing
the clerk to qualify his books, and in permitting introduction of the
entries of a deceased clerk, the latter being tHie very basis and purpose
of the common law regular entry doctrine. Similarly, the statutory
statement of the latter doctrine, in section 327.25, has destroyed its
common law purpose for now the entrant need not be deceased, but
he may be produced to qualify the entries; nor, under section 327.25,
need the entrant be introduced at all, even though he is not dead. Our
statutes in obliterating the common law features of these doctrines,
overlap and merge considerably, giving rise to ambiguity and conflict.
For example, the first portion of section 327.25 requires the produc-
tion of the party making the entry, or the person having custody of
it and is inconsistent with and unnecessary in view of the latter portion
of this section, which makes unnecessary the production of all the per-
sons engaged in keeping a bookkeeping system to verify the entries.
The purpose of admitting either a shop book, or a regular entry, is
to show the amount owing from the adverse party. Only those entries
are relevant which pertain to such balance. Now, in a bookkeeping sys-
tem, an account is composed of one or more entries made in the regular
course of business so that when shop books are introduced, the relevant
portions of it are really regular entries. Admittedly, under the account
book doctrine the entries must have been made by the party or his
agent or servant; but, is an entry so made not in reality a regular
entry? If an entry appears to have been made in a regular course of
business, and the court is satisfied as to its genuineness, the fact that
a third person made such entry ought not alter the mode of admitting it
into evidence. Since the basis of account book doctrine has been re-
moved by making the party a competent witness and since when ac-
count books are admitted into the evidence and relevant features there-
of partake of the nature of regular entries, and since there is consid-
erable overlapping between sections 327.24 and 327.25, quaere ought
not both sections be repealed and a new statute drafted to cover the
field of business entries?
Wisconsin could very well follow New York's new statute on this
Is Wigmore, Sec. 1559. Cross-examination extended only to matters connected
with the entries.
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subject."9 It reads: "Any writing or record, whether in the form of an
entry in a book or otherwise, made as a memorandum or record of any
act, transaction, occurence or event shall be admissible in evidence in
proof of said act, transaction, occurrence, or event, if the trial Judge shall
find that it was made in the regular course of any business, and that it
was in the regular course of such business to make such memoranda or
record at the time of such act, transaction, occurence, or event or with-
in a reasonable time thereafter. All other considerations of the making
of such writing or record, including lack of personal knowledge by the
entrant or maker, may be shown to affect its weight; but they shall not
affect its admissibility. The term business shall include business, profes-
sion, occupation, and call of every kind."
This statute solves the problem of introducing the entries of a com-
plicated accounting system into evidence, and such a statute would
probably have satisfied Justice Marshall in F. Dohmen Co., Ltd. v.
Niagara Fire Ins. Co.20 Perhaps the tests suggested by him in that de-
cision could be used to qualify the entries admitted under it.21
The New York courts in their recent decision upon this matter
have attempted to interpret the statute in accordance with its liberal
purpose. Thus, in Neglia v. Shadrow,22 the court implied that entries
19 Sec. 374-A New York Civil Practice Act. (Cahill's Sixth Edition) (added by
laws, 1928. Chapter 532. September 1.)
2096 Wis. 38, 71 N.W. (1897).
21 "Just how to proceed in such a case (to admit an entry arising out of a com-
plicated accounting system) is by no means free from difficulty. In a large
business, obviously it is impossible to produce witnesses to testify of their
personal knowledge respecting the amount of stock on hand, or to the pur-
chases and sales that may have occurred during a long period of time. The
bookkeeper cannot obviously be expected to testify to more than that the en-
tries were made by him and are correct, according to the facts as reported to
him in the regular course of business. Such information must necessarily come
in to him from a variety of sources; and to verify the same except in the most
important transactions, in a large business, would be utterly impossible * * * "
"such being the case upon such books being reasonably verified as correct
records of the daily transactions in the business as transactions were regularly
reported to the office to be recorded in such books, with proof that the books
-were relied upon by the plaintiff solely as a repository of facts in regard to
the business, and that they were uniformly found to be correctly kept, a wit-
ness who had occasion to refer to them from time to time, and had thereby,
and through a general knowledge of the business, been convinced of their cor-
rectness, might properly testify by their aid, to their contents as facts, without
having personal knowledge of such facts independent of the books, and with-
out even having had any other knowledge of all the individual transactions
than such as one might reasonably be expected to have been generally over-
seeing the business. Such evidence would not be conclusive by any means, but
would constitute evidence bearing on the question in suit proper to be sub-
mitted to the jury with all other evidence in the case." F. Dohnten Co., Ltd.
v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., note 1, supra.
Certain voluminous accounts testified to by the bookkeeper and a party
who had personal knowledge of most of the transactions were admitted in
Lynch v. State, 15 Wis. 40 (1862).
22237 N.Y.S. 200 (1929). This was an action for damages caused by an explo-
sion of gas, resulting from the failure of the gas company to inspect its pipes.
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and notations so long as they are properly authenticated ought to be
admitted. In Needle V. N. Y. Rys. Corp.23 the court refused to admit
a policeman's "blotter" in a personal injury action, pointing out that
while "this section was enacted in order to do away with the archaic
rules of procedure in relation to book entries," "it is to be noted, how-
ever, that in every case where the section applies, the fact must be
found by the trial judge that the entry 'was made in the regular course
of business' * * * " "In the case at bar, to show that this record is
inadmissible, it is only necessary to point out that the statements made
to the policeman, upon which he based his report, were not made by
any person in the regular course of any business, but, on the contrary,
the report of the policeman was made upon the irresponsible gossip of
bystanders and the even more unreliable conclusions of the interested
motorman, who, instead of being so placed as to be presumed to be
without a motive to falsify in helping to make the record, had every
reason to give a biased false report. The police blotter was erroneously
admitted." In Hofstetter v. Goldenberg24 admission in evidence without
proper authentication of so-called minutes taken in an action between
the same parties in another court was held to be error. In In Re Audi-
tore's Estate25 it was pointed out that the entries in books made in the
usual course of business were prima facie proof of the correctness of
assets and liabilities set forth, for the purpose of computing value of
the corporation stock at a particular time. In Johnson v. Lutz,2" the
court referring to the old shop book and regular entry doctrine, said,
"that the rule of evidence that was practical a century ago, had become
obsolete," 27 and that "an important consideration leading to the amend-
ment was the fact that in the business world, credit is given to records
made in the course of business by persons who are engaged in the
business upon information given by others who are engaged in the
In the corroboration of certain testimony, there was an exhibit marked for
identification which bore a notation on the reverse side, as follows: "M. Un-
locked Oct. 3, 1925." "It is the claim of the plaintiff's counsel that the nota-
tion escaped his attention upon the trial. Such writing may become competent
evidence in plaintiff's behalf against the defendant, gas company, at least,
under the provisions of Sec. 374-A of the Civil Practice Act, (as added by
laws of 1928 C.532).
23 227 App. Div. 276, 237 N.Y.S. 547 (1929).
24 132 Misc. 722, 230 N.Y.S. 353 (1928).
25 136 Misc. 664, 24 N.Y.S. 502 (1930).
20 253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E. 517 (1930).
27 "Prior to the decision in the well known case of Vosburgh v. Thayer, 12 Johns
461, decided in 1815, shop books could not be introduced in evidence to prove
an account. The decision in that case established that they were admissible
where preliminary proof could be made that there were regular dealihgs by
the parties; that the plaintiff keeps honest and fair books; that some of the
articles charged had been delivered; and that the plaintiff kept no clerk * * *
since the decision in that case, it has remained the substantial basis of all de-
cisions upon the question in this jurisdiction prior to the enactment in 1928 of
sec. 374-A Civil Practice Act." Johnson v. Lutz, note 33, supra.
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business as a part of their duty." In Warner Quinten Co. v. Ben
Charat, Inc.2s the court points out that "the statute was designed to
remove the restrictions created by the old rule upon the right to use
books of account so as to 'give evidential credit to the books upon
which the mercantile and industrial world relies in the conduct of
business'." In Funk v. Mode Lora Realty29 the court said that "the
very purpose of the statute was to afford a more workable rule of
evidence in the proof of business transactions under existing business
conditions."
It is apparent from the foregoing that the New York statute has sim-
plified procedure in enabling the business man to introduce his books
in evidence without the hampering technicalities and qualifications that
exist under the old rules.
Wisconsin attorneys, when they find difficulty in introducing evi-
dence under sections 327.24 and 327.25, often place the party on the
stand, and use his books or entries as memoranda of recollection.3 0
As a recorded past recollection the party may swear to the accuracy
of the book and use it to the fullest extent, incorporating it with his
testimony and handing it to the jury as a part thereof. The entries are
no longer hearsay; they are adopted by the witness on the stand3' and
he is subject to full cross-examination on that as on all parts of his
testimony. When a party uses his books as memoranda of recollection,
which under existing law he may do, the books are subject to none of
the restrictions of the statutes, regarding clerks, cash payments, credit
28257 N.Y.S. 722 (1932).
29143 Misc. 805, 260 N.Y.S. 844 (1932).
Here the court permitted the introduction in evidence of the original ledger
and monthly statements prepared by the real estate agent who managed the
property and rented the same, the action being one to recover rent on a writ-
ten lease. The court said "it was error for the lower court to set aside the ver-
dict of the jury and order a new trial, since the books and records of the
plaintiff's agent made in the regular course of business were admissible under
sec. 374-A of the Civil Practice Act."
30 The modern use of account books under the statutes like those in Wisconsin,
should be as memoranda of recollection, because the party is a competent wit-
ness. Account books are clearly such memoranda that may be so used. Schet-
tier v. Jones, 20 Wis. 412 (1865). Account books not qualified for admission
under Sec. 327.24, may nevertheless be used to refresh the memory of the
party. Estate of Wallschlager, 187 Wis. 640, 205 N.W. 402 (1925); Ott v.
Cream City Sand Co., 166 Wis. 228, 164 N.W. 1005 (1917). Though the witness
has no present recollection of the matter, but he knows the memoranda were
correct when made, he may testify from them. Bourda v. Jones, 110 Wis. 52,
85 N.W. 671 (1893). Present recollection of the transaction is not necessary.
Curran v. Witter, 68 Wis. 16, 31 N.W. 705 (1887) ; Hill v. State, 17 Wis. 675
(1863). The memoranda may be introduced as a part of the evidence. Camp-
bell v. Germania Fire Ins. Co., 163 Wis. 327, 158 N.W. 63 (1916). For extend-
ed discussion on this subject, see Wigmore, Sec. 1560.
31 Tabular statements made from records, which were before the court, on proof
that such statements were true were admitted not as original but as part of
the witness' evidence. Jordan v. Estate of Warner, 107 Wis. 539, 83 N.W. 946
(1900).
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guarantee, special contracts, kind of occupation, size of item, regularity
of entries, reputation for correct bookkeeping and the like. The statu-
tory method is simple and direct. The primary object is the admission
of the books or entries into evidence. It is then up to the court or jury
to pass upon their weight and sufficiency. It should be unnecessary to
resort to the indirect method of using books and entries as memoranda
of recollection.
